Challenges for the National Institute for Clinical Excellence by Maynard, A et al.
7 Culyer AJ. The rationing debate: maximising the health of the whole
community. BMJ 1997;314:667-9.
8 National Institute for Clinical Excellence.Anakinra for rheumatoid arthritis.
London: NICE, 2003. (Technology appraisal No 72.) www.nice.org.uk/
page.aspx?o = 94670 (accessed 25 Jun 2004).
9 National Institute for Clinical Excellence. Beta interferon and glatiramer
acetate for the treatment of multiple sclerosis. London: NICE, 2002. (Technol-
ogy appraisal No 32.) www.nice.org.uk/page.aspx?o = 27588 (accessed 25
Jun 2004).
10 National Institute for Clinical Excellence.Guidance on the use of imatinib for
chronic myeloid leukaemia. London: NICE, 2002. (Technology appraisal No
50.) www.nice.org.uk/page.aspx?o = 37604 (accessed 25 Jun 2004).
11 NICE Citizens Council. Report of the first meeting: Determining clinical need.
London: NICE, 2003. www.nice.org.uk/pdf/FINALNICEFirstMeeting_
FINALReport.pdf (accessed 25 Jun 2004).
12 NICE Citizens Council. Report on age. London: NICE, 2003.
www.nice.org.uk/pdf/Citizenscouncil_report_age.pdf (accessed 25 Jun
2004).
13 Brazier JN, Jones N, Kind P. Testing the validity of the Euroqol and com-
paring it with the SF-36 health survey questionnaire. Qual Life Res
1993;2:169-80.
14 Anderson RT, Aaronson NK, Bullinger M, McBee WL. A review of the
progress towards developing health-related quality-of-life instruments
for international clinical studies and outcomes research.Pharmacoeconom-
ics 1996;10:336-55.
15 Brooks R. EuroQol: the current state of play.Health Policy 1996;37:53-72.
16 Roset M, Badia X, Mayo NE. Sample size calculations in studies using the
EuroQol 5D.Qual Life Res 1999;8:539-49.
17 Kind P, Hardman G, Macran S. UK population norms for EQ-5D. York:
Centre for Health Economics, 1999 (Discussion paper No 172).
18 Culyer AJ, Wagstaff A. Equity and equality in health and health care. J
Health Econ 1993;12:431-57.
19 Culyer AJ. Economics and ethics in healthcare. J Med Ethics 2001;27:217-22.
20 Culyer AJ. Equity—some theory and its policy implications. J Med Ethics
2001;27:275-83.
21 Culyer AJ. Need: the idea won’t do—but we still need it. Soc Sci Med
1995;40:727-30.
Challenges for the National Institute for Clinical Excellence
Alan Maynard, Karen Bloor, Nick Freemantle
So far NICE has focused on evaluating new technologies rather than existing ones. But this
approach is creating inflationary pressure that the NHS cannot afford
Even with recent large increases in NHS expenditure,
acute funding difficulties continue to emerge. It is
essential that a national mechanism to prioritise new
and existing technologies is available to inform
decision making. The National Institute for Clinical
Excellence (NICE) was created to meet this need.1
However, despite Rawlins and Culyer’s essay on
consultation and equity,2 NICE has yet to mature into
the efficient prioritisation mechanism that is required
to ensure the best use of NHS resources.
Rationing
Rawlins has stated that there is “no role for NICE in the
rationing of treatments to NHS patients.”3 These weasel
words belie the inevitability of healthcare rationing,
which is ubiquitous in all healthcare systems. Rationing
involves depriving patients of care from which they
may benefit and which they wish to have4; this is
inescapably the business of NICE. Indeed, rationing is
the inevitable corollary of prioritisation, and NICE
must fully inform rationing in the NHS.
The issue is not whether but how to ration. The cri-
teria determining access to care depend on the health
goals society is seeking to achieve. Are we solely inter-
ested in efficient use of resources—maximising health
from a given budget? Or does society seek efficiency
and equity and, if so, is it prepared to sacrifice some
efficiency to achieve equity goals? The central nature of
NICE as a prioritisation (and hence rationing) body
means that four fundamental challenges emerge.
These challenges need to be managed carefully and
robustly if NICE is to prosper, as we discuss below.
Restricting access to NHS funding
Currently the role of NICE is too peripheral to the
NHS. For instance, the government should make it
impossible for the NHS to adopt expensive new
technologies until they are approved by NICE. The
additional benefits of most technologies are small—for
example, taxanes may add only a few more months to
life and have adverse side effects for cancer patients.
The function of NICE is to reach a consensus about
clinical and economic evidence. This does not imply
that only cost effective treatments should be funded
but that decisions to fund interventions under the NHS
should be taken after careful consideration of the best
possible information. Such consideration should be
done before, not after, the introduction of new
technologies.
Equity and efficiency trade-offs
Society is clearly not concerned only with efficiency
and using NHS budgets to maximise improvements in
population health. The NHS, in its usual fragmented
and implicit way, illustrates different value systems—for
example, by investing “inefficiently” in low birthweight
babies because our society values highly the lives of the
newly born. In some cases NICE has also operated
a rule of rescue approach to its recommendations
rather than one based solely on effectiveness or cost
effectiveness.5
Education and debate
Department of
Health Sciences,
University of York,
York YO10 5DD
Alan Maynard
professor
Karen Bloor
senior research fellow
Department of
Primary Care and
General Practice,
University of
Birmingham,
Birmingham
B15 2TT
Nick Freemantle
professor
Correspondence to:
A Maynard
akm3@york.ac.uk
BMJ 2004;329:227–9
227BMJ VOLUME 329 24 JULY 2004 bmj.com
If the NHS seeks to achieve greater fairness—for
example, by making quality adjusted life expectancy
more equally distributed through the population—it
follows that NICE must not focus on clinical or cost
effectiveness alone. Its work has to recognise the equity
dimension of healthcare rationing and elicit appropri-
ate trade-offs between efficiency and equity. This could
be achieved, for example, by implementing a fair
innings approach, reflecting the belief that everybody
is entitled to a “normal” span of health.4 Under this
approach, resources would be allocated in order to
achieve equitable distributions of health rather than to
simply maximise health benefits regardless of who
benefits.4
The NHS and other public healthcare systems
were created to improve equity by equalising
access to care in the hope of reducing inequalities in
health. With NICE providing national guidance
on the use of healthcare interventions in the English
and Welsh NHS, it is inappropriate that it continues
to avoid its responsibilities in terms of achieving
equity.
Selecting technologies for approval
Problems also exist with the political process through
which topics are chosen for NICE. Although some
effort has been made to broaden the sources of
suggestions for appraisals, there continues to be
overemphasis on new technologies and relatively little
attention paid to old technologies that may be
redundant. Such technologies could potentially create
resource savings to fund the inflationary pressures of
NICE.
Careful discussion is needed about how to
improve the selection processes further. It might be
useful to experiment, by canvassing a wider group
of NHS decision makers, with some form of
reward for nominating appraisals that could save the
NHS appreciable resources. NICE has developed
patient forums to inform its work but could take
steps to increase the involvement of NHS staff
(who bear the burden of translating NICE guidance
into practice) in selecting appraisal topics. Such
group decisions should be informed by using
activity and prescribing data to identify the
procedures for which expenditure is greatest and
estimate the relative financial burdens of common
procedures.
This information would induce NHS decision
makers to focus more on withdrawing ineffective or
inefficient marginal therapies. Perhaps decision
makers who initiate such appraisals should be able to
retain their local savings? At present, the selection
process remains largely political and only indirectly
influenced by those who face difficult decisions in
service delivery.
Mechanisms to constrain NICE induced
inflation
As Rawlins and Culyer describe,2 NICE does not have
a set threshold at which it is prepared to approve treat-
ments. This has led to the approval of some therapies
with small benefits—for instance, in cancer treatment.6
NICE approvals cause NHS provider organisations
considerable difficulty because of the other cost
pressures they face. These include inflationary pay set-
tlements, the working time directive, and pressure to
achieve access and national service framework targets.
Although practitioners who benefit from NICE
induced service development may be enthusiastic, the
opportunity costs for other service providers are
considerable.
Current consideration of other aspects of the phar-
maceutical market may further increase NHS expendi-
ture. These include the proposed reform of the
Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme, with “free”
pricing of products as one policy option,7 and recent
pressure from the commissioner of the US Food and
Drug Administration for higher prices in Europe, so
that a larger proportion of research and development
costs is borne there.8
Against this background, and given the NICE
threshold for approval is essentially arbitrary, ways
have to be found to economise the use of drugs and
other technologies. This issue could be approached in
several ways:
x Acquire the preferences of key decision makers—for
instance NHS chief executives (motivated by the
solvency of their organisations as well as patient
health) and use them to determine the threshold. This
could lower threshold, perhaps to £12 000-15 000/
quality adjusted life year ($22 000-28 000, €18 000-
23 000) and result in NICE rejecting many more
technologies for NHS use.
x Give NICE an annual notional budget to fund its
recommendations. For example, NICE could be given
£500m a year and would have to cost carefully its pro-
posals and stay within that notional budget or
recommend services suitable to withdraw to fund the
new services
x Give NICE an annual, top sliced, real budget and
require it to fund all its advice within that expenditure
envelope with allocations to trusts to fund its
recommendations.
The most efficient of these three options is
likely to be the third. This would force NICE to
Summary points
Rationing health care is inevitable, and NICE
should inform NHS decision making
Adoption of new technologies by NHS clinicians
should be informed by costs as well as
effectiveness
The NHS needs better information from NICE
on the equity implications of new and existing
technologies
NICE appraisal should focus not only on service
enhancement but also on withdrawal of existing
ineffective or inefficient therapies
Giving NICE a real budget to fund its
recommendations would encourage it to examine
the effect of its decisions on the whole NHS
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determine the value of the additional therapies at the
margin, examine the effect of their decisions on the
whole NHS, and also provide incentives to balance
cost enhancing against cost reducing recommenda-
tions.
The pharmaceutical industry is unlikely to react
positively to these proposals, as they would make
rationing tighter and potentially shrink its UK market.
Such a reversal of NICE’s current propensity to be the
marketing arm for companies would have political
consequences and requires careful management.
Conclusions
It is not sufficient for Rawlins and Culyer2 to claim that
the resource implications from NICE decisions are the
responsibility of government. A new approach has to
be found to manage the use of drugs and other
technologies within the NHS. We believe NICE should
be given a real, annual, top sliced budget and required
to fund all its advice within that expenditure envelope.
This will have the advantage of forcing NICE to exam-
ine the cost effectiveness of existing treatments as well
as new ones.
The success of commercial, provider, and regula-
tory interests in focusing NICE’s work on new,
expensive technologies has been self serving and infla-
tionary. This inflation should be controlled through
manipulation of the NICE threshold for approval. The
NHS cannot afford NICE generosity, even with
increased NHS funding, because of the resource
demands of other access and national service
framework targets, many of which have yet to be evalu-
ated by NICE.
Greater success in rationing will bring greater
political and media challenges. These should be
anticipated and managed carefully. This will be
especially important as over the next few years the cur-
rent substantial growth in NHS expenditure is likely to
fade, and NICE will have to make hard choices in a
much more difficult economic climate.
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Drummond, Mark Sculpher, and Alan Williams and was
presented at NICE’s annual conference by Alan Maynard in
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and Sandi Newby for administrative help.
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A memorable patient
How life events change patients’ perspectives of their conditions
In September 1939 the second world war had just begun as
Germany invaded Poland, and 12 year old Agnes was evacuated
from Liverpool to a family in Northwich, Cheshire, for safety
from bombing. Within a few months her dormant atopic eczema
had flared, and she was treated at a local clinic. By March 1940,
her mother was missing her and decided, as most Liverpool
mothers did, to bring her child back home to the city as she
preferred to have all the family together if the worse should
happen.
Around this time the government implemented a Children’s
Overseas Reception Board, a plan designed to keep children safe
from German attack by placing them in Commonwealth
countries (New Zealand, Australia, Canada) or the United States
with relatives or willing host families for the duration of the war.
Agnes was placed on the list as her father had a sister living in
New York at the time.
The eczema flared again, starting on her neck, and a few days
later it extended. Her excoriated eczematised skin was
complicated by extensive herpes simplex over the face. It was so
severe that she was only able to drink through a straw. Regular
medical check ups were mandatory for would-be evacuee
children, as they had to be fit and ready to leave at a moment’s
notice. Agnes attended the Sugnall Street Clinic behind the
Philharmonic Hall. She was prescribed sulphur ointment, which
began to heal her infected skin.
A ship then arrived in the port of Liverpool to take the
children away from the very real dangers of war. However,
Agnes’s mother received a letter stating that her daughter would
not be included because her rash had not cleared and the risk of
spreading infection to others aboard was still present. This was a
major disappointment, as the family was having to shelter under
the Anglican Cathedral from the German bombs. Agnes’s
mother, however, consoled her by saying “Man proposes, but God
disposes.”
She was proved right, as the ship on which Agnes had been
due to sail was the ill fated City of Benares. This ship was
torpedoed 600 miles and five days out from Liverpool by the
German U-boat 48 on 17 September 1940 at 10 30 pm with the
loss of 294 lives, including 73 children, 11 of whom were from
Liverpool. This tragedy ended the Children’s Overseas Reception
Board.
Agnes never complains when she has a flare of her eczema as
she realises it ultimately saved her life.
Julian Verbov professor of dermatology, Royal Liverpool Children’s
Hospital, Liverpool
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